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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Re-Defining the Role of the Canadian Judiciary 
in Bankruptcies and Receiverships 
Stephanie Ben-lshai* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Consistent with prevailing neo-liberal ideologies, the Canadian 
bankruptcy system has become increasingly privatized. Parties have 
been left to bargain in the shadow of the law to determine which busi-
nesses will be rehabilitated, and how best lo deal with those businesses' 
financial difficulties. The Canadian judiciary facilitates the process, but 
it is largely the debtor corporation and its major creditors that drive it. 
Situated in this context, this commentary considers the broader issue of 
how contracts entered into by a debtor corporation prior to bankruptcy 
will be treated on the bankruptcy of the debtor corporation. It focuses in 
particular on successor employer liability issues. The treatment of em-
ployees in bankruptcy brings into focus the potential inequities that can 
surface when the rights of third parties can be negotiated away without 
their consent, in what is, in practice at least, an increasingly privatized 
bankruptcy process. 
A significant group of stakeholders in any corporate bankruptcy is 
the debtor corporation's employees. Employees' wages and benefits arc 
negotiated in their employment contracts and collective agreements. 
Once wages and benefits have been agreed upon, employees are gen-
erally not in a position to alter the agreed upon wages and benefits-in 
particular, when the financial situation of their employer changes. Em-
ployees usually do not know if their employer is likely to go bankrupt 
and arc generally not in a position to demand risk premiums. Accord-
ingly, certain provisions are in place in Canadian labour legislation and 
in bankruptcy legislation to protect employees. The protection provided 
by these provisions is threatened when a receiver is put into place to 
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realize the assets of the employer corporation. In an effort to realize on 
such assets, a receiver may continue the employer's operations with a 
view to selling the corporation as a going concern and may continue to 
employ the dchtor corporation's employees. However, a common prac-
tice has developed in Canada, where receivers, who are increasingly 
court appointed and derive their authority and powers from a court 
order, 1 attend on a hankruptcy judge ex parte with a draft order agreed 
upon by the debtor corporation and the major creditors. The draft order 
gives the receiver extensive powers, and at the same time limits the 
nature of the receiver's liahility to employees and unions, even if they 
do continue to operate the former employer's husiness. 2 
The recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in GMAC Commercial 
Credit Corp. v. TCT Logistics lnc. 1 ("TCT') signifies a shift hy Canadian 
courts in the direction of a principled framework for grappling with the 
relationship hetween the roles and jurisdiction of private parties, receiv-
ers, trustees, hankruptcy judges, and provincial labour hoards in dealing 
with employees' rights when a corporation is in financial trouble. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal in TCT considered: ( 1) whether the bankruptcy 
court4 has the authority to effectively immunize a receiver or a trustee 
' Sec Peter P. Farkas, "Why Are There So Many Court-Appointed Receiverships'?" 
(2003) 20 Nat'l Insolv. Rev. 37. Over the last decade the receivership landscape has 
changed significantly from a situation where the majority of receiverships were 
private appointments, usually initiated by Canadian banks, to the current situation 
where the majority arc court appointed. 
Other provisions that arc generally provided for in a receivership order include: 
authorization for the receiver to take possession of the debtor's assets and to carry on 
its business: authorization to market and sell a debtor's business and/or assets subject 
to court approval: authorization to conduct an investigation into the debtor's financial 
affairs: a requirement that all books, records and information related to a debtor's 
affairs he delivered to the receiver, upon such request: provisions that deem the 
receiver not to have liability for a debtor's existing environmental problems: provi-
sions that "stay" third parties from interfering with the debtor's business, including 
terminating agreements and cutting off utilities: authorization to borrow funds to 
allow the business to operate during the receivership period: and limitations on a 
receiver's liability, except in the case of gross negligence and willful misconduct. 
Ibid., at 3. 
' (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 1284, 2004 C.L.L.C. 220-029, 185 0.A.C. 138, 48 C.B.R. 
(4th) 256, 40 C.C.P.B. 45, 238 D.L.R. (4th) 677 (Ont. C.A.). 
4 Unlike the American context, in Canada there is no actual "bankruptcy court" or 
"bankruptcy judge." See lain Ramsay, "Interest Groups and the Politics of Consumer 
Bankruptcy Reform in Canada" (2003) 53 U.T.L.J. 379 at 393, 399. All Superior 
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in bankruptcy appointed under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act5 
("BIA") from the obligations of a successor employer where that prac-
titioner operates the debtor's business in nrder to sell it as a going 
concern; and (2) the test to be applied by the bankruptcy court for 
granting a union leave to bring successor employer proceedings before 
the Ontario Labour Relations Board ("OLRB"). 
The majority reasons in TCT, written by Feldman J.A., with Cronk 
J.A. concurring, reached two significant conclusions. First, the bank-
ruptcy cou11 does not have the authority to determine whether a receiver 
or trustee carries on the business of a debtor as a successor employer, 
rather the OLRB has exclusive jurisdiction to make this determination. 
Second, the bankruptcy court, in its exercise of supervisory control, can 
deny leave to bring successor employer proceedings against a trustee or 
receiver before the OLRB based on factors relevant to the bankruptcy 
and the best interests of all stakeholders. 
On the basis of these two conclusions, the majority remitted the 
matter back to the bankruptcy court, which had previously denied the 
appellant union leave to commence successor employer proceedings 
before the OLRB. The bankruptcy court was directed to determine 
whether to grant leave on the basis of the test articulated by the majority. 
The third member of the panel in TCT, Mac Pherson J .A., dissented 
on the second conclusion reached by the majority, as he would have 
granted the appellant leave to commence proceedings before the OLRB. 
2. FACTS 
The TCT proceedings arose out of three OLRB applications filed 
by the Industrial Wood and Allied Workers of Canada, Local 700 (the 
"Union") without leave of the bankruptcy court that was overseeing the 
interim receivership of TCT Logistics Inc. and related companies (col-
lectively "TCT"). The Union was the exclusive bargaining agent for the 
Court judges in the provinces and territories have jurisdiction in bankruptcy. Certain 
Superior Court judges handle a larger number of bankruptcies and have developed a 
specialization in commercial bankruptcy. For the purposes of this article, the terms 
bankruptcy court and bankruptcy judge arc used in the same manner as in the TCT 
reasons. 
' R.S.C. 1985. c. B-3. 
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70 employees at one of the warehousing facilities located on Horner 
A venue operated by TCT. 
TCT became insolvent in January 2002, and moved under s. 47 of 
the BIA and s. 10 I of the Courts <~(Justice Ac{' for an order appointing 
KPMG Inc. as interim receiver over the assets of TCT. The order grant-
ing interim receivership powers subject to court supervision was granted 
on January 24, 2002 (the "Order"). Among other standard provisions, 
the Order provided that KPMG Inc. would shut down and sell TCT's 
businesses and assign TCT into bankruptcy. The Order also provided 
that KPMG Inc. was empowered to engage, retain, discharge, or termi-
nate employees of TCT, hut any such actions would not establish it as a 
successor employer under the Ontario Labour Relations Act, 19957 
("LRA") or any other provincial or federal statutes. Further, no actions 
or proceedings could he commenced against KPMG Inc. in any court or 
other tribunal without leave of the bankruptcy court. 
Following its appointment as interim receiver, KPMG Inc. entered 
into an asset purchase agreement with Spectrum Supply Chain Solutions 
("Spectrum")-a corporation formed by the former management of 
TCT. Spectrum set up operations in a Toronto neighborhood that was 
located in close proximity to TCT's Horner Avenue warehouse, with 
essentially the same customer base. As part of the asset purchase agree-
ment, where Spectrum purchased TCT's assets with the exception of 
two warehouses, KPMG Inc. retained Spectrum to manage the wind 
down of the two warehouses. One of these was the Horner A venue 
warehouse that gave rise to this appeal. KPMG Inc. terminated all un-
ionized employees at the Horner A venue warehouse, although some 
were later rehired by Spectrum to work at the new Spectrum warehouse, 
without regard to Union seniority. 
The Union alleged in its applications to the OLRB that Spectrum 
was incorporated for the sole purpose of acquiring TCT's warehousing 
assets and that the purpose of the asset purchase agreement between 
Spectrum and KPMG Inc. was to oust the Union and to operate TCT's 
warehousing business in Toronto under substantially the same manage-
ment hut without a union. 
'' R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. 
7 S.O. 1995. c. I, Schcd. A. 
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3. COURT OF APPEAL DECISION 
(a) BIA Receivership Orders Are Not Immune to OLRB 
Scrutiny 
(i) Majority Reasons 
The three members of the Court of Appeal panel in TCT all agreed 
that ss. 69( 12) and 114( 1) of the LRA give the OLRB the unequivocal 
and exclusive jurisdiction to decide the successor employer issue for 
labour relations purposes in every case. Accordingly, the standard prac-
tice of inserting clauses in receivership orders that exclude successor 
employer liability cannot serve to immunize receivers' actions from 
review by the OLRB. The Court reached this conclusion after reviewing 
ss. 47(2) and 14.06(1.2) of the BIA. These provisions, read together, 
give the bankruptcy court the power to direct the receiver to carry on 
the business of the debtor and at the same time provide that the receiver 
will not be liable for any obligations incurred by the debtor corporation 
before the date of bankruptcy. However, the BIA provisions are silent 
on any obligations that the receiver may incur following his or her 
appointment, which may include successor employer liability under the 
LRA. Accordingly, s. 72 of the BIA, which provides that the BIA will 
only abrogate or supcrcede provincial law if the law is in conflict with 
the BIA, is not applicable. That is, the language of the BIA provisions 
docs not conflict with the successor employer provisions in the LRA 
and accordingly docs not abrogate or supercede them. 
(ii) Commentary 
The Court of Appeal's reluctance to allow receivership orders 
drafted by the parties and "rubber stamped" by the bankruptcy court to 
interfere with the mandatory nature of successor employer liability with-
out the scrutiny of the OLRB is justified given the greater potential for 
information asymmetry. The purpose of the successor employer provi-
sions in the LRA is to accord protection to unions from employers who 
might attempt to disenfranchise them through corporate manipulations. 
The theoretical underpinnings for successor employer provisions may 
be explained in part by human capital literature.8 This literature empha-
" Sec for example, Gary S. Becker, Hu111a11 Capital, 2d ed. (New York: National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 1975). 
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sizes the need to compensate employees for firm training that enhances 
the employee's productivity only within the firm, hut docs not make the 
employee more productive to other employers.') As both the employee 
and the employer have invested in this form of firm training, a fair 
contract is one where they share the costs and benefits, and in many 
instances may account for a divergence between the employee's actual 
wages and the wages that the employee could seek in the market. 10 
Because the employer will generally have an informational advantage 
in determining the firm-specific value of a worker's time, a role for 
unions as monitors of the employment relationship exists. The union's 
monitoring function is necessary because the employer has an incentive 
to reduce wages whenever they exceed the wages that the employee 
could seek in the market. 11 
In situations where a trustee or a receiver runs a business for a 
period of time they may have a greater incentive, as compared with the 
original employer, to reduce wages so as to generate a surplus that can 
be realized in the ultimate sale of the business or the assets. Given that 
the trustee or receiver will he exiting the employment relationship in a 
relatively short period of time, they will he less concerned about the 
reputational impacts of opportunistic wage cutting. Further, the trustee 
or receiver will have an information advantage regarding the circum-
stances of the debtor corporation. Accordingly, a mandatory successor 
employer rule that can not he altered hy a bankruptcy court order ap-
pointing a receiver and that requires the trustee or receiver to honour the 
debtor corporation's collective agreement is optimal. 
At the same time, the importance of protecting employee rights 
needs to he balanced against the central role that the trustee and/or the 
receiver plays in the bankruptcy process. Practitioners have argued that 
the danger with potential successor employer liability is that it will he 
difficult to attract qualified professionals to serve as receivers or trustees, 
and that where practitioners take on such appointments they will act too 
cautiously. 12 In the context of a healthy, robust economy, the end of the 
'' Ibid., at 26-37. 
"' Ibid. 
11 Keith H. Hylton & Maria O'Brien Hylton, '"Rent Appropriation and the Lahor Law 
Doctrine of Successorship'' ( 1990) 70 B.U.L. Rev. 821 at 835-836 (Lexis). 
12 Supra. n. 3 at paras. 55-56. 
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20th century witnessed a similar concern about the personal liability that 
was being placed on directors and officers, as well as gatekeepers such 
as lawyers, underwriters, and most notably, auditors." The response to 
the so-called liability crisis, which resulted in a reduction of professional 
liability on many fronts, has assisted in creating an environment in which 
many professionals have been lax about their conflicts of interest, have 
succumbed to management pressure to approve financial documents in 
a certain way, and overall have not performed their jobs of being inde-
pendent scrutinizers of financial documents prepared hy management 
adequately. 14 The outcome of a rhetoric that advocated limiting liability 
had disastrous outcomes in the governance of healthy corporations that 
should not he replicated in the context of financially troubled corpora-
tions. 
Further, it should he noted that trustees and receivers can limit the 
potential for successor employer liability in the bankruptcy context hy 
seeking advance agreement from unions before making any key deci-
sions. As Feldman J.A. noted in her reasons, it is in the unions' as well 
as the other corporate stakeholders' interests to reach a compromise 
given their mutual interest in the continuation of the business. 
(b) The Bankruptcy Court's Gatekeeping Function ands. 215 of 
the BIA 
The concern that receivers and trustees have with increased liability 
to employees when they operate a debtor corporation's business has the 
potential to be reduced by the bankruptcy court's supervisory role. This 
role involves both helping unions work with receivers and/or trustees to 
negotiate a compromise as to how employees will be treated, and ren-
dering leave decisions under s. 21.5 of the BIA. That section provides 
that, "except by leave of the court, no action lies against the Superinten-
dent, an official receiver, an interim receiver or a trustee with respect to 
any report made under, or any action taken pursuant to, this Act." Ac-
cordingly, the bankruptcy court is required lo exercise a gatekeeping 
function and to screen any actions that third pa11ies may wish to take 
1.i Poonam Puri & Stephanie Ben-Ishai, "Proportionate Liability Under the CBCA in 
the Context of Recent Corporate Governance Reform: Canadian Auditors in the 
Wrong Place at the Wrong Time?" (2003) 39 Can. Bus. L.J. 36. 
14 Ibid. 
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against receivers and trustees, among others, and to grant leave in the 
appropriate circumstances. The rationale behind s. 215 is that "single 
control" is necessary in order for the bankruptcy court to address fairly 
and orderly the interests of every effected party and to avoid a multi-
plicity of proceedings. 
(i) Majority Reasons 
In her analysis of s. 215, Feldman J.A. noted that the test for leave 
has historically developed in the context of tort or fraud actions against 
a trustee where the test for leave was a low one. In that context, all that 
was required was a cause of action against the trustee and a factual 
foundation that was not frivolous or vexatious. A demonstration that the 
case could he made out was not required. In contrast, in the context of 
unions seeking leave to proceed to the OLRB for successor employer 
declarations, the actual substance of the leave test has not heen devel-
oped. This is because where the issue arose in the past, leave was not 
granted on the basis that a collective agreement is a contract that ter-
minates on bankruptcy. In rejecting this line of analysis, Feldman J.A. 
held that a collective agreement is not terminated for all purposes in 
bankruptcy and that the status of a collective agreement is governed by 
the LRA and the OLRB. 
While Feldman J.A. rejected the line of analysis that suggests that 
a collective agreement terminates on bankruptcy, she did not adopt the 
s. 215 test that has been developed in other contexts, and would have 
suggested in this context that the bankruptcy court's sole role was to 
determine whether there were facts that would allow the OLRB to de-
clare the trustee or receiver a successor employer. Feldman J .A. held 
that unlike the situation where an action is brought against a trustee or 
a receiver for the ways in which their duties were carried out during a 
bankruptcy, in the context of a successor employer issue, the outcome 
of whether or not to grant leave is central to the bankruptcy or receiv-
ership as a whole. That is, the leave decision has implications for all 
stakeholders, including employees that need to be balanced by the bank-
ruptcy court in making this decision. Accordingly, Feldman J.A. held 
that a bankruptcy court granting leave under s. 215 of the BIA must 
consider the following factors: 
[T]he timing of the application. the complexity of the receivership and the de-
mands on the receiver as it carries out its obligations. the potential duration of the 
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period that the receiver intends to operate the business hefore it can he sold 
(normally as hrief as possible), the availability of potential purchasers and their 
financial strength, and the likelihood that a purchaser will he declared a successor 
employer and assume all of the obligations under the collective agreement. This 
latter factor may he particularly important hecause it will give practical assurance 
to the union that all the terms of the collective agreement will he honoured and 
the employees protected. Another key factor is the practicality of proceedings 
hefore the OLRB and the timeliness of a hearing hefore the tribunal in the context 
of the proposed temporary operation of the business and its sale. Finally, the court 
may consider the issue of immediate fairness to employees, including any ar-
rangements that the receiver has made with the union to attempt to accommodate 
its requirements during the period hefore the business is sold. 
(ii) Dissenting and Concurring Reasons 
In dissent, MacPherson J.A. rejected Feldman J.A.'s test for grant-
ing leave to the OLRB for successor employer applications and instead 
adopted the test as articulated by Osborne J.A. in Mancini (Trustee of) 
v. Falconi 10 at 334: 
I. Leave to sue a trustee should he not granted if the action is frivolous or 
vexatious. Manifestly unmeritorious claims should not he permitted to pro-
ceed. 
2. An action should not he allowed to proceed if the evidence filed in support of 
the motion, including the intended action as pleased in draft form, does not 
disclose a cause of action against the trustee. The evidence typically will he 
presented hy way of affidavit and must supply facts to support the claim sought 
to be asserted. 
3. The court is not required to make final assessment of the merits of the claim 
hefore granting leave. 
In adopting the Mancini test, MacPherson J.A. noted that Feldman 
J.A. was essentially allowing receivers and trustees to immunize them-
selves from the successor employer provisions by using s. 215 of the 
BIA, despite asserting that appointment orders under s. 47(2) of the BIA 
could not be used to do the same thing. MacPherson J.A. also expressed 
concern that the hurdles for employees and unions seeking leave under 
s. 215 appeared to be higher under the test articulated by Feldman J.A. 
as compared with the test that had been applied to creditors in the past. 
Cronk J.A. concurred with Feldman J.A.'s reasons and suggested that 
in futures. 215 decisions, the higher standard for leave applications will 
" (1993), 1993 CarswellOnt 1861, (suh nom. Mancini (Bankrupl) v. Falconi) 61 
0.A.C. 332 (Ont. C.A.). 
250 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW 120 B.F.L.R.I 
apply in situations not related to successor employer provisions, and 
accordingly, will not present a higher hurdle for employees and unions 
as is suggested by MacPherson J .A. 
(iii) Commentary 
MacPherson J.A. raises a valid concern with respect to the different 
standards that will apply to different stakeholders seeking leave under 
s. 215 of the BIA. Feldman J.A. distinguishes between a situation such 
as Mancini, where the issue was trustee wrongdoing, and a situation 
where factors relating to the bankruptcy court's control over the bank-
ruptcy process arise. It would have been helpful for Feldman J.A. to 
have elaborated on a framework for distinguishing between the situa-
tions when the Mancini standard for leave will apply and the situations 
when the newly formulated standard will apply outside of the successor 
employer and OLRB contexts. Given that the Mancini test has been 
applied to creditors in the past, the majority reasons do suggest a hier-
archy between creditor stakeholders and other stakeholders, as Mac-
Pherson J.A. notes. However, given Feldman J.A.'s careful analysis 
throughout the reasons in TCT of the multiple stakeholders who have 
interests that must he balanced in bankruptcy, it does not appear that it 
was her intent to create such a hierarchy. A statement in future jurispru-
dence to the effect that the nature of the s. 215 test turns on whether 
granting leave will take away from the existence of a central controlling 
forum and not on the identity of the stakeholder who brings such an 
application would help to clarify this issue. 
With respect to the second point of disagreement between the ma-
jority and the dissent, it is important to note the difference between the 
role of the receiver and/or trustee and the bankruptcy court. In focusing 
on this distinction, it becomes clear that Feldman J.A. was not using s. 
215 to enable what she rejected under s. 47. Court-appointed receivers 
and trustees play a central role in the effective implementation of bank-
ruptcy law in Canada. As court-appointed officers they have an obliga-
tion to ensure that bankruptcy laws arc applied effectively and impar-
tially. Gi vcn their access to detailed information surrounding the 
corporation and its affairs, they arc also in the best position to make 
informed decisions. However, receivers and trustees arc not a substitute 
for the bankruptcy court. 
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Due process in bankruptcy proceedings requires that a court of 
competent jurisdiction adjudicate a dispute between a receiver or a 
trustee and an interested party. Given that bankruptcy is a legal process, 
there are important limits on how much the court's role can he dimin-
ished. The majority reasons in TCT limit the amount of authority without 
liability that can be conferred on receivers and trustees by parties who 
use s. 47(2) of the BIA to ask the bankruptcy court to "rubber-stamp" 
private agreements that immunize them from liability to third parties. 
At the same time, the majority reasons recognize that at times the careful 
balancing act that is necessary to liquidate a corporation with the least 
impact on third parties could be severely disrupted by a multiplicity of 
proceedings related to the bankruptcy process in other forums. It is 
within this context that Feldman J.A. has provided an orderly process 
for ensuring that stakeholders, unions in this case, can he given an 
opportunity to appear before a bankruptcy court if they feel that their 
rights have not been adequately protected in the private decisions made 
by the receiver or trustee, the debtor corporation, and major creditors in 
the negotiation process. The s. 215 test articulated by the majority, with 
a clarification that its application does not turn on the identity of the 
stakeholder who brings the application, is well suited to the delicate 
balancing act that takes place in the corporate bankruptcy context. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeal's decision in TCThas disturbed the status quo 
understanding of receiverships where private parties, irrespective of the 
rights of third parties, can agree upon the terms and have them rubber 
stamped ex parte by the bankruptcy court. Instead, the Court of Appeal 
has given greater "teeth" to the bankruptcy court's gatckeeping function. 
However, the s. 215 test articulated by Feldman J.A. will only be effec-
tive if the Canadian judiciary has sufficient capacity to implement it. 
Given this renewed emphasis on the role of the judiciary in the 
Canadian bankruptcy system, it will be important to develop a better 
understanding of which members of the Canadian judiciary are handling 
bankruptcy cases and how. In addition, TCT provides an opportunity to 
give careful thought to the creation of social context education 16 specif-
'" See Richard F. Devlin ... Jurisprudence for Judges: Why Legal Theory Matters for 
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ically designed for bankruptcy judges. It is true, as Feldman J .A. notes 
in her reasons, that qualities of a good bankruptcy judge include exper-
tise, sensitivity and speed. However, equally important qualities for 
bankruptcy judges include the ability to understand the impact of social, 
economic, cultural, and political forces on the issues and corporate 
stakeholders that appear before them. The diversity of these contexts is 
often hidden from view when the same group of bankruptcy practitioners 
and judges with shared socio-economic backgrounds, gender, and race, 
repeatedly appear in Canadian bankruptcy courts. In addition to imple-
menting some form of social context education, it will be impmtant to 
encourage the development of a new generation of bankruptcy practi-
tioners and members of the judiciary who arc able to contribute the 
diverse perspectives and life experiences of employees and other stak-
eholders in the bankruptcy process, while at the same bringing the 
necessary expertise and integrity to this legal process. 
Social Context EJucation" (200 I) 27 Queen's L.J. 161, for a further Jiscussion of 
this concept. 
